Since Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is a suite of products, rather than just one single piece of software, there are various places where you can create exclusions for different features. Also, there are integrations in other products, that result in possible side effects when enabling certain settings. Most of these products have separate documentations, there is no single documentation page that contains all the information about exclusions available in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

Creating and maintaining a secure environment is hard. And with every technology or product added to your environment it gets more complicated. Microsoft Azure as a cloud environment is no exception to this rule and with the many services and features that get added every year it just gets more complicated even if you did not change a thing. Because keeping your IT assets secure is important as you move to the cloud, it is important to know which bad practices to avoid and which attack scenarios are out there.

…or SCRIL in a hybrid environment. What could possibly go wrong? Way before the term “passwordless” was used by Microsoft to promote the use of alternative authentication methods besides a password there already was a way to go passwordless. In Active Directory there is a feature called SCRIL to achieve exactly this. SCRIL which is short for “Smart card is required for interactive logon” is an effective way to prevent any interactive sign-in to a domain joined machine using a password for the user that holds this attribute.

When you work with one or multiple Microsoft Sentinel workspaces you may find it necessary to not only deploy Analytics rules and other configuration artifacts using a version controlled source control (CI/CD) to limit human error and enforce consistency. But you might also want to independently verify your deployment on a regular basis. I certainly did and set out to write a test driven solution. Since I love to use PowerShell and there is already a superb test framework, the tool to use for the task at hand was an easy choice: Pester.

While working on another blog post I looked at different lateral movement paths an attacker can use, when she has compromised the Azure AD Connect server. Since this is the gateway to the cloud environment there already is quite some research available. When reading the existent posts about this topic, the main lateral movement path mentioned is a password reset to take over a privileged account synced to the cloud. But with a restrictive Conditional Access policy in place that requires MFA or even FIDO2 for administrative users, this is not enough for an account takeover.

If you have worked with Microsoft Sentinel you will, at one point, stumbled over two different file formats for Analytics Rules: YAML and ARM. The YAML format is mostly used to distribute Analytics Rules between people. All Analytics Rules you will find in the official Sentinel GitHub repo and others out there are offered in this format. The ARM format is what you need to deploy the Analytics Rules when using a pipeline or even if you want to import them using the UI in Microsoft Sentinel.

Business email compromise and phishing are just two of the threats sent to hundreds and thousands of email inboxes around the world every day. As defenders, we use various tools and methods to limit the delivery of these emails to the intended target. In most cases, the attackers start by registering a domain that closely resembles the target company’s own domain name, or simply include the company name in the domain (e.

Integrate MDI health alerts in Microsoft Sentinel or how to turn every e-mail notification in a custom alert in Sentinel and customize alert details for your benefit.